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Abstract. Power diagrams, a type of weighted Voronoi diagrams, have many applications
throughout operations research. We study the problem of power diagram detection: deter-
mining whether a given finite partition of Rd takes the form of a power diagram. This
detection problem is particularly prevalent in the field of information elicitation, where one
wishes to design contracts to incentivize self-minded agents to provide honest information.
We devise a simple linear program to decide whether a polyhedral cell decomposition can be
described as a power diagram. Further, we discuss applications to property elicitation, peer
prediction, and mechanism design, where this question arises. Our model is able to efficiently
decide the question for decompositions of Rd or of a restricted domain in Rd. The approach
is based on the use of an alternative representation of power diagrams, and invariance of a
power diagram under uniform scaling of the parameters in this representation.
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1 Introduction and Background
Power diagrams play an important role in many disciplines within operations research, ranging
from balanced least-squares clustering [11, 12, 13] to multiclass classification [8, 10, 14, 16, 28, 29].
They have recently surfaced in the domain of information elicitation, where one wishes to design
contracts or mechanisms to incentivize a self-minded agent to reveal their private information
truthfully [1, 17, 18, 19, 21]. In the latter, power diagrams are shown in various settings to char-
acterize the possible sets of information that can be treated identically under the mechanism, an
important step in understanding which mechanisms can and cannot be truthful, i.e., elicit this
information effectively. Motivated by this application in particular, where one wishes to know
whether a given mechanism or contract could be truthful, we study the problem of power diagram
detection: deciding whether a given cell decomposition is in fact a power diagram.
We begin with a formal definition of a power diagram [4].
Definition 1 (Power Diagram, Original). Given a set of sites s1, . . . , sk ∈ Rd and weights
w1, . . . , wk ∈ R, we define the cell corresponding to site si as
cell(si) =
{
x ∈ Rd : i ∈ argminj ‖x− sj‖
2 − w2j
}
. (1)
A cell decomposition P = (P1, . . . , Pk) of R
d is a power diagram if there exist {si}ki=1 ⊆ R
d and
{wi}ki=1 ⊆ R so that for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k} we have Pi = cell(si), as in Eq. (1).
Informally, the cell of a power diagram is the set of all points which are closest to the corresponding
site in squared Euclidean distance, discounting each site by its weight squared. For the sake of
simplicity, we assume that cell decompositions in Rd have full-dimensional cells.
Several basic observations follow from this definition. First, note that cell(si) depends on all
sites s1, . . . , sk and weights w1, . . . , wk. Second, setting w1 = · · · = wk recovers the definition of
a Voronoi diagram, where points are assigned to a partition according to which site is closest in
Euclidean distance. Third, any power diagram is a polyhedral cell complex, in the sense that all
of its cells, and the interesections of these cells, are polyhedra. In particular, the shared boundary
of any pair of cells is either empty or is contained in a hyperplane, and thus can be described via
linear constraints. Power diagrams exhibit many useful properties beyond the basic observations
above, see e.g. [3, 4, 9, 10, 15].
The problem we consider is the following: given some polyhedral cell complex P , where the cells
are described by linear inequalities, determine whether or not P is a power diagram. In Section 2,
we devise a novel linear program to solve this problem with a running time complexity that is
(at most) weakly polynomial. We treat two variants of the problem, where P decomposes Rd and
where it decomposes a restricted convex domain D ⊆ Rd. We then present and discuss several
applications to information elicitation in Section 3. We conclude in Section 4 with a brief review
of our contribution and additional challenges in practice.
2 Power Diagram Detection by Linear Programming
We devise a linear program to check whether a given polyhedral cell complex can be represented
as a power diagram. For this, recall that polyhedra can be described as the intersection of finitely
many halfspaces. Let us begin with a formal problem statement.
Problem 1 (Power Diagram Detection). Let P = (P1, . . . , Pk) be a polyhedral cell complex defined
by a set of separating hyperplanes between the cells. Let the index sets Ji = {j : dim(Pi ∩ Pj) =
d− 1} give the adjacency structure in the complex. Finally, let aij ∈ Rd and γij ∈ R with
Pi = {x ∈ R
d : aTijx ≤ γij ∀j ∈ Ji}. (2)
Decide: Is there a set of sites {si}ki=1 ⊂ R
d and {wi}ki=1 ⊂ R such that Pi = cell(si) for all
i ∈ {1, . . . , k}?
Related questions have been studied (for stronger input) in the literature: Based on the information
in an incidence lattice of a cell complex, it is possible to determine whether the cell complex is
the Voronoi diagram of a set of sites in time linear in the number of facets of the cell complex [5].
A similar result, with time linear in the number of vertices of the cell complex, holds in the
dual setting of Dirichlet tesselations [2]. Rybnikov presented an algorithm to decide whether a
cell complex given through an incidence graph with information on facets and (d−2)–faces is a
power diagram [25]. The algorithm is based on finding a feasible point in a set of equalities and
strict inequalities. Its running time is weakly polynomial provided one can address its numerical
instability and the challenging implementation of a tailored interior point method.
In this paper, we devise a simple solution to Problem 1 that will give a straightforward resolution
for applications such as those outlined in Section 3. The advantages lie in a simple implementation,
solvability by any linear programming algorithm, numerical stability, and a practical running time
that matches its (favorable) theoretical bound; see Theorems 1 and 2.
Our first tool is the use of an alternative definition of power diagrams, which has been devised
in different ways, ranging from pairwise linear separation in a multiclass setting [8, 9, 10] to duality
theory [15].
Definition 2 (Power Diagram, Alternative). Given a set of sites s1, . . . , sk ∈ Rd and γ1, . . . , γk ∈
R, we define the cell corresponding to site si as
cell(si) = { x ∈ R
d : (sj − si)
Tx ≤ γj − γi ∀j 6= i} . (3)
A cell decomposition P = (P1, . . . , Pk) of R
d is a power diagram if there exist {si}ki=1 ⊆ R
d and
γ1, . . . , γk ∈ R so that for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k} we have Pi = cell(si), as in Eq. (3).
It is easy to match this definition with the original notion of a power diagram through a small
transformation [10]: The cells Pi and Pj are separated by the hyperplane
Hij := {x ∈ R
d : ‖si − x‖
2 − wi = ‖sj − x‖
2 − wj}
= {x ∈ Rd : 2(sj − si)
Tx = (sTj sj − wj)− (s
T
i si − wi)}
2
Choosing γi =
1
2
(sTi si −wi) for i ≤ k yields this new representation, which fits with the definition
of piecewise-linear separability [8] with the small exception that we use weak instead of strict
inequalities. The right-hand sides in the above take the form γj − γi. This means that the ability
to devise a set of sites {si}ki=1 ⊆ R
d and γ1, . . . , γk would be a positive resolution to Problem 1.
Our second tool is the invariance of power diagrams under scaling [6, 9]. More precisely, the
above representation of power diagrams is invariant under scaling of all si and γi, for all i ≤ k,
with the same parameter. For our purposes, it is important to note that in the representation of
Hij , all parameters can be scaled with a λij > 0 without changing Hij :
2(λijsj − λijsi)
Tx = λijγj − λijγi ⇔ λij · 2(sj − si)
Tx = λij · (γj − γi)⇔ 2(sj − si)
Tx = γj − γi.
Of course, the hyperplane specified by aTijx ≤ γij in Eq. (2) is similarly invariant under joint scaling
of the left-hand and right-hand sides.
These tools allow us to construct a linear program to check whether the cells specified by the
given input can be represented as the cells of a power diagram. Recall Eq. (2), which states the cells
of the input as Pi = {x ∈ Rd : aTijx ≤ γij ∀j ∈ Ji}. We have to match these with the description of
the cells as specified in Eq. (3), cell(si) = { x ∈ Rd : (sj − si)Tx ≤ γj − γi ∀j 6= i}. By the above,
we may use any joint scaling of aij and γij by a factor λij in this match.
Consider the following linear program for power diagram detection (PDD)
λij · aij = si − sj ∀i ≤ k, ∀j ∈ Ji
(PDD) λij · γij = γj − γi ∀i ≤ k, ∀j ∈ Ji
λij ≥ 1 ∀i ≤ k, ∀j ∈ Ji
First, note that the aij and γij are given. The {si}ki=1 ⊆ R
d, the γ1, . . . , γk ∈ R, and the λij
∀i ≤ k, ∀j ∈ Ji are variables. Further, note that we do not specify an objective function. We
are only interested in finding a feasible solution, so a dummy objective function or a Phase-0
formulation of this program will be sufficient.
For all hyperplanes in the form aTijx ≤ γij specified by the original input, this linear program
checks whether aij and γij can be jointly scaled to match Definition 2 of a power diagram. These
are the first two lines of the program.
Due to the invariance of power diagrams under joint scaling of all their parameters, the con-
straints λij ≥ 1 ∀i ≤ k, ∀j ∈ Ji may be imposed without losing the ability to construct a power
diagram (in the cases where this is possible). These additional constraints guarantee that no trivial
scaling λij = 0 and sj = si is feasible, as well as that no negative scaling λij < 0 is feasible, so
that the direction of the separation of cells Pi and Pj cannot change.
We now use (PDD) to show the weakly polynomial solvability of Problem 1.
Theorem 1. For all rational input, Problem 1 can be solved in weakly polynomial time by finding
a feasible solution to (PDD). For a yes-instance, a representation of a power diagram is returned.
Proof. Recall that linear programs can be solved in weakly polynomial time through some variants
of interior point methods, or the Ellipsoid method. As all the parameters in (PDD) are from
the original input, it suffices to show that the number of variables and constraints is strongly
polynomial in the size of the input.
Let p =
∑k
i=1 |Ji|. There are exactly 3p constraints and k variable vectors of type si ∈ R
d, k
variables of type γi, and p variables of type λij , giving a total of kd+ k + p variables.
The variables {si}ki=1 ⊆ R
d and γ1, . . . , γk ∈ R of a feasible solution represent a power diagram
for a yes-instance, as in Definition 2. Further, appropriate values for weights wi (as in Defintion 1)
can be derived from the γi through the equality γi =
1
2
(sTi si − wi) for i ≤ k. ⊓⊔
In the next section, we exhibit a collection of applications in which power diagram detection
arises. The practical problems essentially fit with the statement of Problem 1, with the exception
that often the domain is restricted, in the sense that the cells Pi given are actually Pi∩D for some
(full-dimensional) domain D. We therefore must address the problem of power diagram detection
in restricted domains, where one asks whether the given cells can be expressed as a power diagram
restricted to D. We formally capture this problem in the following.
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Problem 2 (Power Diagram Detection for Restricted Domains). Let D ⊆ Rd be a convex domain,
and let P = (P1, . . . , Pk), Pi ⊆ D, be a polyhedral cell complex restricted to D defined by a set of
separating hyperplanes between the cells. Let the index sets JDi = {j : dim(Pi ∩ Pj) = d− 1} give
the adjacency structure in the complex. Finally, let aij ∈ Rd and γij ∈ R with
Pi = {x ∈ D : a
T
ijx ≤ γij ∀j ∈ J
D
i }. (4)
Decide: Is there a set of sites {si}ki=1 ⊆ R
d and {wi}ki=1 ⊆ R such that Pi = cell(si) ∩ D for all
i ∈ {1, . . . , k}?
This problem variant can be resolved through a small tweak to (PDD): the index sets Ji are
replaced with the index sets JDi . We obtain the following linear program for restricted power
diagram detection (r-PDD) for the detection of a power diagram in a restricted domain:
λij · aij = si − sj ∀i ≤ k, ∀j ∈ JDi
(r−PDD) λij · γij = γj − γi ∀i ≤ k, ∀j ∈ JDi
λij ≥ 1 ∀i ≤ k, ∀j ∈ JDi
We now show that Problem 2 is also weakly polynomially solvable. On one hand, we do not
find this result surprising, as the structure of the associated linear program essentially remains
the same as for Problem 1. However, one has to take special care to understand the impact of the
restricted domain, and why the program does not give false-positive answers.
Theorem 2. For all rational input, Problem 2 can be solved in weakly polynomial time by finding
a feasible solution to (r-PDD). For a yes-instance, a representation of a power diagram is returned.
Proof. The running time claim, and the return of a representation of a power diagram for yes-
instances, follows analgously to the proof of Theorem 1. The single, yet important difference lies
in the restricted domain D. We have to consider how the index set JDi in Problem 2 relates to the
cells Pi in the restricted problem. More precisely, we have to make sure that a yes-answer to the
problem corresponds precisely to those inputs, where the polyhedral cells in the domain D come
from the intersection of a power diagram in Rd with the domain D.
To this end, let P ′ be a cell complex in Rd as defined in Problem 1, and let Ji be the correspond-
ing index sets. Further, let JDi be the index sets as defined in Problem 2. Note J
D
i ⊆ Ji. Thus any
feasible solution (s, γ) to (PDD) (for index sets Ji) is also a feasible solution to (r-PDD) (for index
sets JDi ). Recall that, by Definition 2, a feasible solution (s, γ) for (PDD) provides the parameters
to represent a power diagram P ′ in Rd. This implies that if there exists a power diagram P ′ in Rd
with P = P ′ ∩D, the corresponding (s, γ) is a feasible solution to both (PDD) and (r-PDD) and
we correctly identify a yes-instance for Problem 2.
It remains that show that all no-instances are identified correctly, as well. Assume there is a
feasible solution (s, γ) to (r-PDD), and let P ′ be the corresponding power diagram in Rd. Let
index sets Ji and J
D
i represent the adjacency of cells of P
′ in Rd, respectively in D, as defined in
Problems 1 and 2. We have to show that P = P ′ ∩D.
By construction, Pi = {x ∈ D : (sj − si)Tx ≤ γj − γi ∀j ∈ JDi } and P
′
i ∩ D = {x ∈ D :
(sj − si)Tx ≤ γj − γi ∀j ∈ Ji} for all i = 1, . . . , k. This gives (P ′i ∩D) ⊆ Pi for all i = 1, . . . , k.
Now, recall that the cells Pi decompose the convex domain D, i.e.
⋃k
i=1 Pi = D with int(Pi) ∩
int(Pj) = ∅ for i 6= j. But as P
′ is a power diagram of Rd, the (P ′i ∩ D) also decompose D, i.e.
we have
⋃k
i=1(P
′
i ∩D) = D and int(P
′
i ) ∩ int(P
′
j) = ∅ for i 6= j. Together with (P
′
i ∩D) ⊆ Pi, we
obtain Pi = (P
′
i ∩D) for all i = 1, . . . , k. This proves the claim. ⊓⊔
3 Applications to Information Elicitation
In the domain of information elicitation, one wishes to design contracts or mechanisms to incentivize
a self-minded agent to reveal their private information truthfully. Often this private information
comes in one of two varieties: a belief about some future event, or a utility or valuation about
4
sun rain
snow
D
Psun Prain
Psnow
(L)
sun rain
snow
D
Psun
Prain
Psnow
(M)
sun rain
snow
D
Psun Prain
Psnow
(R)
Fig. 1: (L) The cell decomposition corresponding to the mode functional, which is a power diagram
(indeed, a Voronoi diagram) intersected with D, the probability simplex over outcomes {sun, rain,
snow} projected onto R2. (Take e.g. sites at the corners of the simplex, with equal weights.)
(M) Another cell decomposition which is a power diagram intersected with D, and therefore
corresponds to an elicitable property. Note that the index set would be Jsun = {rain, snow} in
Problem 1, whereas JDsun = {rain} in Problem 2. (R) A cell decomposition which is not a power
diagram intersected with D, and therefore not an elicitable property.
a particular commodity or outcome. Power diagrams play a central role in the design of such
mechanisms, as characterization theorems show that contracts or mechanisms are truthful (have
the correct incentives) if and only if they partition the information space (or “type space”) into
cells that form a power diagram. As the information space is typically not all of Rd, we will work
with the restricted version, Problem 2. In what follows, we show how to apply Theorem 2 to three
such information elicitation scenarios where power diagrams arise.
Property Elicitation. One of the most basic information elicitation tasks is to design a contract
to elicit some function, or property, of an agent’s belief. The literature dates back to Savage [27]
and Osband [23], with its modern incarnation beginning with Lambert et al. [20, 21]. Concretely,
consider a finite set of outcomes O, the set of probability distributions ∆(O), a finite set of possible
reports R, and a property Γ : ∆(O) → 2R which designates a set of reports considered “correct”
or “desired” for an agent with a particular belief. For example, the map Γ (p) = argmax
o∈O p(o)
is the mode functional, which one notes is set-valued whenever there are multiple outcomes with
the highest probability.
To elicit the property Γ from an agent, we wish to design a contract S : R × O → R which
determines the payment to the agent once the outcome materializes. The protocol is thus: the score
S is announced, the agent reports some r ∈ R, the outcome o ∈ O is revealed, and the agent is
paid S(r, o). We say that the score S elicits the property Γ if for all beliefs p ∈ ∆(O), we have
Γ (p) = argmax
r∈R
Eo∼p[S(r, o)] , (5)
that is, the agent maximizes their expected score according to their belief p by reporting r ∈ Γ (p).
For example, if one would like to know which of sun, rain, or snow, is most likely for the weather
tomorrow, one would setR = O = {sun, rain, snow} and offer to pay the agent S(r, o) = 1{r = o},
for the simple reason that this score elicits the mode: argmaxr Eo∼p[1{r = o}] = argmaxr p(r).
A natural question is thus the following: for which properties Γ can one devise a score which
elicits it? Perhaps surprisingly, the answer is simple: the elicitable properties Γ are precisely those
for which the partition P = (Pr)r∈R given by Pr = {p : r ∈ Γ (p)} forms a power diagram [17, 21].
More precisely, after projecting to R|O|−1, e.g. by dropping the last coordinate, the partition forms
a power diagram intersected with the (projected) probability simplex. See Figure 1(L) for an
illustration of this projection for the mode. The rough intuition for this result is as follows: Eq. (1)
can be expressed via an argmin over k affine functions of x by dropping the irrelevant ‖x‖2 term,
and then as the negation of an argmax of affine functions. As the expected score is linear (and
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therefore affine) in the agent’s belief p, the distributions p which share the same optimal report
(i.e., the same argmax) must form a cell of a power diagram.
With this characterization at hand, as a practical matter, it becomes relevant to test whether a
given polyhedral cell complex, dividing the probability simplex into regions with the same report,
forms a power diagram. This test can be done via Theorem 2, where the restricted domain D is
the probability simplex, D = {x ∈ Rd :
∑d
i=1 xi = 1, xi ≥ 0 ∀i ≤ d}. Note that the restricted
domain can indeed change the index sets from (PDD) to (r-PDD), and even when Pi∩Pj 6= ∅, one
could still have j /∈ JDi , as we illustrate in Figure 1(M).
Essentially the same formalism as described above arises in machine learning as well, in the
context of designing loss functions for classification or ranking tasks [1, 7, 24]. Here one may wish
to assign certain distributions over the labels (or classes) to different reports, and one may ask, for
which such assignments does there exist a loss function which, when minimized, would yield these
reports. This is again the same question as whether the property corresponding to this assignment
is elicitable, where we simply negate the score to obtain a loss.
Peer Prediction. A problem closely related to property elicitation is peer prediction, where one
has access to several agents rather than one, but no direct access to the ground truth. Instead
of designing a contract which scores an agent’s report based on some observed outcome, one will
never see the outcome, and therefore must score the agents based on each other’s reports [22, 30].
To make headway, one typically assumes some structure about the underlying Bayesian (or
pseudo-Bayesian) process through which agents form their beliefs. In particular, one typically
assumes that agents receive some signal S ∈ O about the true outcome (like the quality of a hotel,
or the correct label for an image classification task), and from this signal form a posterior belief
p(·|S) about the true outcome, or about what another agent’s signal was. By making assumptions
about the possible values of this posterior, one can design mechanisms which have a truthful
equilibrium, in which each agent simply reports their signal S.
Constraints on the possible posteriors in the literature often take the form p(·|S = o) ∈ Po
for some sets {Po : o ∈ O}, dubbed a belief model constraint in Frongillo and Witkowski [18].
Their work shows that there exists a mechanism with a truthful equilibrium if and only if the
sets {Po} form a power diagram [18, Corollary 3.5]. (More precisely, there must exist a power
diagram with sites so such that Po ⊆ cell(so) for all o ∈ O, but we restrict attention to maximal
constraints, where every distribution is allowed to be the posterior following some signal.) The
problem of detecting whether a belief model constraint supports a mechanism, and constructing
said mechanism if so, thus reduces to detecting and constructing a power diagram in a restricted
domain (again the probability simplex), to which Theorem 2 applies.
t(o2)
t(o1)
p1
p3
p2
t(o2)
t(o1)
p1
p0
p3
p2
Fig. 2: An allocation rule “skeleton” which cannot be completed to an implementable allocation
rule for any distinct choices of pi (left), and one which could be so completed for appropriate
choices of pi (right). Here t denotes the type of an agent, and t being the cell corresponding to pi
implies the allocation f(t) = pi.
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Mechanism Design. In mechanism design, one wishes to design an algorithm to choose an out-
come based on the reports of the participants, but in a way which is robust to strategic misreports.
From the well-known revelation principle, we may assume without loss of generality that the reports
or “bids” submitted to a mechanism take the form of utility functions: each participant reports
their utility for each possible outcome. From the reported utilities (called types) of the agents, the
mechanism then chooses a distribution over outcomes (called the allocation) as well as a payment
owed the mechanism by each participant. For simplicity, we will consider the case of a single agent.
Given the agent’s type t ∈ RO which encodes their utility t(o) following each outcome o, the
mechanism wishes to choose a random allocation from some set O of outcomes, as well as the
amount the agent should pay. Formally, given a finite outcome space O and a convex type space
T ⊆ RO, a (direct, randomized) mechanism is a pair (f, p) where f : T → ∆O is the allocation
rule and p : T → R is the payment function. We typically assume that the agent’s utility is quasi-
linear in the sense that their net utility upon allocation o and payment c is the difference t(o)− c.
Note that the expected utility can be written U(t′, t) = f(t′) · t − p(t′), where the inner product
is between elements of RO, where we consider f(t′) ∈ ∆O ⊂ RO to be the vector form of the
allocation distribution. We say the mechanism (f, p) is truthful if U(t′, t) ≤ U(t, t) for all t, t′ ∈ T .
A fundamental question in mechanism design is implementability: given a desired allocation
rule f , can one find a payment function p such that the pair (f, p) is a truthful mechanism? In
other words, can one design payments to implement the desired allocation rule while being robust
to the incentives of the agents? (If given the allocations themselves, one can use the fact that weak
monotonicity (WMON) is sufficient and perform checks in O(n2) time [26].) We consider the fol-
lowing variant of this classic question: given the “skeleton” of an allocation rule, that decides upon
“cells” of types to assign the same allocation but not what that allocation should be, could there
be any assignment of allocations to cells such that the resulting allocation rule is implementable?
See Figure 2 for an illustration. More formally, given the skeleton g : T → {1, . . . ,m}, could there
be any implementable allocation rule of the form f = h ◦ g for some h : {1, . . . ,m} → ∆(O)?
From [17, 26], such skeletons must form a power diagram, and thus, given g in the form (4) where
D = T is the type space, this problem can also be solved as stated in Theorem 2.
4 Conclusion
We have presented a simple linear program for power diagram detection, the problem of deciding
whether a polyhedral cell decomposition given by linear equalities can be represented as a power
diagram. The problem of power diagram detection arises in information elicitation applications, and
we have detailed three such applications, to property elicitation, peer prediction, and mechanism
design. In each of these problems, the domain is typically restricted to a subset D of Rd, and
thus we have also addressed the restricted power diagram detection problem (Problem 2 and
Theorem 2), to determine whether the given complex can be represented as a power diagram
restricted to D. Combined, our results give a (weakly) polynomial time algorithm to determine
whether a given property is elicitable, whether a given belief model constraint corresponds to a
truthful peer prediction mechanism, or whether a given allocation “skeleton” could extended to an
implementable allocation rule.
As a practical concern, we note that information elicitation problems do not necessarily exhibit
polyhedral representations of their cells. More precisely, it is possible that the cells of a proposed
property, belief model constraint, or allocation rule, are not convex polyhedra, and thus could
not possibly be represented as those of a power diagram. Even when they allow a polyhedral
representation, the input may be given in a form such that this is not obvious. For example, given
a representation of a polyhedron as the convex hull of its vertices, it typically is not efficient to
devise a representation as the intersection of halfspaces. In many applications, expert knowledge
will allow a viable resolution of these issues, before the methods presented in this paper will be
applied. In general however, they pose significant challenges before obtaining a broader detection
algorithm in practice.
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